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From Local Insurgency 
to Al-Qaida Franchise
On 11 December 2007 two car bomb-
ings targeting UN buildings and the 
Constitutional Council in different 
neighbourhoods of the Algerian capi-
tal caused at least sixty two casualties 
while injuring more than a hundred 
others. The bombings moved the inter-
national community and disgruntled 
the Algerian public as “Al-Qaida in the 
land of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) 
claimed responsibility for the attacks 
calling the UN “the international den of infidels.” The bombings sig-
nalled the transformation of a localized Islamist insurgency, the Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Predication 
and Combat, GSPC) into a member of the Global Jihad movement. 
While AQIM, just like the GSPC, still acts first and foremost to desta-
bilize the Algerian state, the movement has adopted an international 
discourse in which it fulminates against the West in general and against 
the US and France in particular. Far from being a sign of strength, it is 
the weakness of the movement and the unintended consequences of 
the War on Terror that have radicalized the movement. 
During the 1990s Algeria was enmeshed in a civil war that caused 
more than 150,000 casualties but from which emerged a period of 
relative calm and stability. While there remained 
several armed Islamist groups at large, it was the 
GSPC that had been the most active one in fight-
ing the Algerian regime. The group emerged from 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) after it broke down 
into several splinter groups in the second half of 
the 1990’s, as a result of the extremist attitude 
of its leadership under the emirs Djamel Zitouni 
(1994-1996) and after him Antar Zouabri (1996-
2002).1 It was in late 2006 that the local franchise 
of Al-Qaida became active with repeated bomb-
ings and attacks and the first suicide attacks the 
country witnessed on 11 April 2007. The AQIM 
group is now seen as a potential threat by the in-
ternational community. This became even clearer 
in the beginning of 2008 when the Paris-Dakar 
rally—passing through Mauretania and Mali—was 
cancelled after a statement, presumably issued by 
AQIM, that branded the race neo-colonialist and accused Mauritania of 
collaborating with “crusaders, apostates, and infidels.”2
The War on Terror
Throughout 2005 and 2006 most observers in and outside Algeria 
agreed that the GSPC found itself politically isolated, under pressure of 
the security forces, and lacking basic infrastructure and means (money, 
weapons, logistics, popular support). The combined action of the govern-
ment with its efficient security policy and its reconciliation programme 
seemed to bear its fruits. However, the “framing” of the fight against the 
GSPC into the logic of the global War on Terror has prompted the United 
States to grant military, logistic, and intelligence support to the Algerian 
regime. The active cooperation between the US and Algiers led to a grow-
ing number of youngsters in Northern Algeria wanting to fight in Iraq and 
a mounting displeasure in the Sahel-region, a hitherto peaceful region 
turned into a securitized area “seemingly full with terrorists.” Since 2003 
the Sahel region has become a second front against terror. US and Alge-
rian troops have militarized and securitized a vast Saharan region stretch-
ing over parts of Mali, Mauretania, Niger, and Chad. Today, it becomes 
clear that the Algerian government tried to link the GSPC to the “Saharan” 
corridor as a means to “attract” US military help.3
Marginalized, the GSPC’s “Afghan” core, 
the militants who fought in Afghani-
stan against the Russians and who 
came back to Algeria in the 1990s, 
made some appeal to Al-Qaida for 
help in order to win the franchise of 
the movement. After contacts with the 
leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, 
the GSPC officially shifted in Septem-
ber 2006 from a local group which was 
active within Algeria into an organiza-
tion with—at least in discourse—regional ambitions…thus becoming 
in a way something that the Algerian and US security communities 
were saying already existed.
The shift became complete with the adoption of the new name and 
the espousal of new strategies of violent action, including suicide 
attacks. While the group carries out symbolic attacks in the heart of 
Northern Algeria (capital and central cities), it also uses the tribal areas 
of the East and the mountainous regions of the West as its strongholds. 
The choice is based on the consideration that the militants can better 
adapt to this area on the borders of several countries than in the sub-
urbs of the heavily policed cities of the North. 
The new name does not really change the movement’s organiza-
tion but offers the possibility for the movement to access more easily 
the channels and funds of recruitment networks of people around the 
globe who are sympathetic to the fight against the US army in Iraq. 
This shift does not entail a shift in authority over the movement as no 
international or foreign player (Bin Laden or otherwise) can dictate the 
movement’s strategy. Some observers even suggest that the adoption 
of an Al-Qaida affiliation has been a conscious effort of the movement 
to: “keep Algerian fighters from leaving their home country and to at-
tract them to the fight against the Algerian government.”4
New tactics
While AQIM still tries to destabilize the Algerian regime—just like the 
GSPC before—it has nevertheless introduced new tactics that aim to 
rekindle the insurgency and increase the number of recruits. First of all, 
there was since the end of 2006 a growing number of smaller attacks in 
the tribal areas of the East of the country and in provinces far from Algiers 
that seem unavoidably linked to the movement’s search for funds and 
the control over parts of the trade routes through the desert. AQIM seems 
to be in part reliant on the proceeds of trading in stolen vehicles, smug-
gling cigarettes and drugs, and people-trafficking as well as “tax-levies” 
on smugglers looking for safe passage through the Algerian desert. Alge-
rian newspapers have regularly reported on the link the jihad groups and 
criminal activities. These allegations should be taken with precaution but 
it is nevertheless likely and logical that AQIM is in search of funding.5 
Secondly, the group clearly started targeting foreigners working in the 
oil and gas industry as well as in the development sector. For example, ac-
cording to the al-Jazeera website, the AQIM stated on 21 September that: 
“This morning, the morning of the blessed Friday, 9 Ramadan 1425 AH 
at 0715, the martyr hero Othman Abou Djaafar drove a vehicle—brand 
Mazda—loaded with more than 250 kg of explosives to target the French 
crusaders who are building the biggest dam in El Hammam Maala vil-
lage near Lakhdaria.” Algerian security services admitted that nine people 
were wounded, including two French nationals and an Italian.
Defying “foreign” nationals and their presumed interests has always 
been a tactic that aims to show the strength of the group as well as 
putting the foreign support of the Algerian regime under pressure. New 
for the AQIM—in comparison with the GSPC—is that these operations 
bolster its media presence by taping the operations and posting the vid-
eos online, particularly the attacks that target foreign workers. The usage 
One of the unintended consequences of the 
global War on Terror in the Maghreb is the 
transformation of the local Islamist insurgency 
into an Al-Qaida franchise. The Salafi Group 
for Predication and Combat, which in the past 
targeted the Algerian government, has now 
become part of the global jihad against the 
enemies of Islam. With the transformation new 
tactics such as suicide-attacks and assaults on 
foreigners have emerged.
The new tactics and 
the merger with 
Al-Qaida have led to 
generalized internal 
dissent …
I S I M  R E V I E W  2 1  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 8  1 7
Salafism
of multimedia technology (especially the Internet) is a new component in 
the ideological battle for the movement, which signals the fact that AQIM 
has stepped up its global propaganda. Posting its attacks on Al-Qaida af-
filiated websites has given the movement the opportunity to recruit new 
militants from several other countries in the Maghreb. 
Thirdly, the group also introduced the use of suicide attacks against of-
ficial buildings such as army barracks, security services buildings, police 
stations, or other governmental agencies. These attacks are carried out 
by a new generation of younger militants, foremost interested in fighting 
the Americans in Iraq and mainly recruited in Algerian mosques that are 
not controlled by the state. However, after their training, they are more 
and more asked to carry out attacks in the country itself. The enlistment 
of young teenagers who have been excluded from the educational sys-
tem and who come out of impoverished backgrounds of the capital city’s 
suburbs (where the GSPC has numerous contacts) as well as the recruit-
ment of foreigners (mainly Libyans, Malians, Mauritanians, and Tunisians 
but only few, if any, European Muslims until today) is presumably a sign of 
the movement’s loss of members which for months has been emptying 
the terrorist organization of its resources. 
Internal dissent
The new tactics and the merger with Al-Qaida have led to general-
ized internal dissent, massive defections, and a general disarray over 
what course to follow. The rather unilateral decision of the emir of the 
GSPC, Abu Mus‘ab Abd al-Wudud, aka Abd al-Malek Droukdel to join 
the Al-Qaida movement directly led to divisions and disagreements. 
The emir was—until his removal during last summer—facing harsh 
criticisms and strong opposition to his methodology of carrying out 
attacks using explosives in public areas and robbing the money of 
Muslims and terrorizing them. Hassan Hattab, the founder of the GSPC, 
denounced on several occasions the new methods used by the group 
and has accused Abd al-Malek Droukdel of turning Algeria into a sec-
ond Iraq. He also tried to convince the terrorists still active to lay down 
their weapons and give themselves over to the authorities. He finally 
rendered himself to the authorities in September.
Another prominent leader, Salim al-Afghani from the Humat Al-
Da‘wah Al-Salafiya (Protectors of the Salafi Da‘wa) declared that he was 
against joining Al-Qaida for many reasons, including the fact that AQIM 
treats innocent civilians as crusaders or blasphemers plus its abandon-
ing of the doctrines of Sharia and focusing on recruitment of young 
men whom are used to carry out suicide attacks. The issue of suicide at-
tacks has indeed divided the Islamist armed groups. Newly “imported” 
into Algeria in 2006, most of the armed groups have rejected the strate-
gy. This became all the more clear when, after the first suicide attack of 
2008 on 29 January in Thenia, AQIM stated in a press release its disgust 
at the radio programmes on Quranic teachings and the scholars that 
proved that suicide attacks were illegitimate in Islam.6
The continuous bomb attacks have shown however that the nu-
merous defections of both leaders and militants from the movement, 
the internal conflicts, and the government’s reconciliation policy are 
incapable of completely bringing an end to the violence. While there 
are inherent deficiencies in the national reconciliation policy (lack of 
resources, no ideological or psychological help) it is clear that the pro-
gramme has also had success. Around 6,000 militants have renounced 
terrorism since 1999 (as part of the civil harmony law), and another 
2,000 repented over the past two years as part of the Charter for Peace 
and National Reconciliation.7
With the 11 December attacks and a string of lesser publicized am-
bushes and bombings during the fall of 2007, 
AQIM seems to be increasing the level of violence 
again. It looks like Algeria will be facing terrorist at-
tacks under Islamist banners in the coming years. 
However, it is also obvious that these groups can-
not really count on large popular support. Only a 
growing feeling of insecurity and destabilization 
of the Algerian state could bring into turmoil a 
population that is largely against terrorism. Dis-
satisfaction with the government (that is already 
struggling to keep up its legitimacy in the face of 
growing socio-economic problems) can make it 
easier for AQIM to recruit the disappointed youth. 
While the access to the collection of funds from 
protection rackets and smuggling, and an increas-
ingly sophisticated Internet-based exposure will 
keep the material basis of the insurgents stable, it 
is the growing dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq 
and the global War on Terror that will remain the 
underlying political basis of the movement’s per-
petuation and its global Jihadi agenda. The “duty” 
to fight the “enemies” of Islam will remain a po-
tent slogan in the coming years as the War on Ter-
ror keeps generating unintended and unwanted 
consequences. One thing is sure: it has not made 
the world any safer. 
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